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Abstract
Spontaneous interaction is a desirable characteristic associated with mobile and
ubiquitous computing. The aim is to enable users to connect their personal
devices with devices encountered in their environment in order to take advantage
of interaction opportunities in accordance with their situation. However, it is
difficult to secure spontaneous interaction as this requires authentication of the
encountered device, in the absence of any prior knowledge of the device. In this
paper we present a method for establishing and securing spontaneous interactions
on the basis of spatial references that capture the spatial relationship of the
involved devices. Spatial references are obtained by accurate sensing of relative
device positions, presented to the user for initiation of interactions, and used
in a peer authentication protocol that exploits a novel mechanism for message
transfer over ultrasound to ensures spatial authenticity of the sender.
1 Introduction
Spontaneous networking is of potentially great value to mobile users as it can
enable them to associate their personal devices with devices encountered in their
environment, and thereby to take advantage of serendipitous interaction oppor-
tunities. Spontaneous interaction in ubiquitous computing has for example been
studied for applications such as social interaction and game-playing in mobile
user communities. However, the potential of such interactions extends into areas
that may involve more sensitive data and transactions, such as use of a vending
machine over a wireless link, or direct payment transactions between two mo-
bile devices. For such applications to be acceptable in a spontaneous network
setting, a user must be able to authenticate the interaction of their personal
device with the intended target device. They must be able to ascertain that the
network entity their device connects to is identical with the physical device `in
front of them'. Furthermore, given the inherent vulnerability of a wireless com-
munication channel, they must be able to rule out the presence of a third party
established as `man-in-the-middle' between their device and the target.
In a managed network environment, device-to-device authentication would
be based on prior knowledge of each other or access to a trusted third party, but
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necessary to provide an out-of-band mechanism alongside the wireless channel,
for secure key exchange or verification of keys that have been `speculatively'
exchanged over the wireless channel. A wide range of mechanisms have been
discussed in the literature, from user entry of PIN codes [1] and direct electrical
contact [2] to use of communication channels with inherent physical limitations,
such as infrared, audio and ultrasound [3,4].
In this paper we present a novel approach for device-to-device authentication
in spontaneous networks. The main contribution is a method that uses spatial
references to establish and authenticate interaction between a pair of devices.
Spatial references capture the spatial relationship with a target device in terms of
bearing and distance, and are used in an authentication protocol that couples key
verification with verification of the relative position of the sender. The method
and protocol are a general contribution in the sense that they can be implemented
with any peer-to-peer sensing approach capable of providing accurate relative
bearing and distance. However, we also contribute a concrete implementation,
using a combination of radio frequency (RF) and ultrasonic (US) communication
for measurement of spatial relationships.
As ultrasonic ranging is susceptible to certain attack scenarios (as we will ex-
plain in the course of the paper), we further contribute a novel coding technique
for spatially-dependent message transfer over an ultrasonic channel. This tech-
nique allows a sender to transmit a message such that it can only be successfully
decoded if it is received at a particular range. The technique is a key component
in the protocol implementation we present, but can have wider application in
ultrasonic systems independent of the particular problem we consider here.
In the subsequent section we will position our research with respect to related
work, and then proceed to a description of the overall design of our method,
the underlying sensing approach and the proposed user interface. This will be
followed by a threat analysis, the description of a peer device authentication
protocol as our core contribution, and an analysis of security and performance.
2 Related Work
Peer device authentication was first highlighted as a distinct security challenge
emerging in ubiquitous computing by Stajano and Anderson, who proposed
the `Resurrecting Duckling' model for secure transient device association, boot-
strapped from direct electrical contact [2]. Others have proposed channels for
authentication that do not require direct contact but are `location-limited' [3]
or `physically constrained' [4], including infrared beams [3], laser beams [5], and
ultrasound [6]. Our method of spatial references effectively expands on the idea
of location-limitation, using spatial measurements in addition to channel limita-
tions, in order to further limit the position from which a device can successfully
authenticate.
A variety of methods rely more on the user for device authentication, for
instance for manual key entry [1], scanning of visual tags on the target and com-
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generated by devices [8]. Our approach also has the user in the loop, however
does not involve any user interaction solely targeted at security. Instead, we
provide the user with a spatial technique for initiating interaction with another
device; the spatial relationship is captured in this process and is then used for
securing the interaction without need for further intervention of the user.
Our concrete implementation is based on the use of US as out-of-band chan-
nel. Kindberg et al. have before us proposed the use of US alongside an RF
wireless channel in a protocol for validation and securing of spontaneous inter-
action [6]. The idea of the protocol is for devices to first exchange keys, and then
to verify that the intended device is in possession of the correct key, by having
the device send a nonce in plaintext over ultrasound and over RF. However, the
protocol design does not consider potential attacks on the ultrasonic channel.
A specific problem is the reliance on ultrasonic time-of-flight measurements for
verification of device authenticity, as these involve synchronisation over the RF
channel and are open to attack scenarios in which an attacker may appear nearer
or further than they are [9]. As the protocol has not been implemented it is also
not clear how precisely the nonce would be transmitted and what the security
implications of this would be. In its general design, our protocol is similar to
that of Kindberg et al., but we attend specifically to the issue of trustworthiness
of ultrasonic ranging, and provide a complete implementation with security and
performance analysis.
Other related work includes spatial interaction techniques. Hazas et al. [10],
while not considering security, have presented an approach that uses ultrasonic
peer-to-peer sensing for spatial discovery of other devices within interaction
range, and work expanding on this has considered visualisation of the devices'
positions in the user interface in order to ease interaction across devices (e.g.
enabling transfer of a document to another device by a simple drag-and-drop
operation) [11,12]. We employ the same principle in our method to let users ini-
tiate spontaneous interactions by means of spatial discovery and selection of the
target device, but extend the approach by adding security in a seamless manner.
3 Security by Spatial Reference
Central to our method is the concept of Spatial References. A spatial reference
captures the spatial relationship of a client device with a target device. A key
aspect of spatial references is that they can be obtained independently by a user
(seeing devices in front of them) and by their device (using sensors), and that a
user can match what their device senses with what they see. Spatial references
thus serve to establish shared context between a user and their device: a device
can report a discovered network entity in a manner that the user can match with
encountered devices, and a user can identify a target device in a way that their
device can match with network entities.
43.1 Design of the method
In our method for establishing and securing spontaneous interactions, spatial
references are used for discovery of devices, for selection of a target devices,
and for verification that interaction is secured between the `right' devices. This
involves the following steps:
1. The user's device uses a combination of network discovery and spatial sensing
for spatially-bounded discovery of devices.
2. The spatially discovered devices perform spatial measurements to compute
their relative positions.
3. Users are provided with a visualisation of available devices, integrated in the
user interface of their personal device and laid out in correspondence with
computed positions relative to the user's device.
4. Users initiate interaction and communication with a device by selection of the
corresponding visual object, using direct manipulation techniques available
in their user interface.
5. Selection of a device for spontaneous interaction triggers a protocol for key
exchange with the target device and verification that no other devices can
be present as `man-in-the-middle' between the user's device and the target.
6. Once it has been asserted that exchanged keys are authentic, they are used
for securing the communication channel between user device and target, and
the initiated interaction can take place.
3.2 Spatial discovery and sensing
For a concrete implementation of spatial discovery and sensing we base our
method on the Relate system for relative positioning introduced by Hazas et
al. [10]. The Relate system provides wireless sensors implemented as USB don-
gles that can be readily used to extend host devices (such as laptops or PDAs)
with spatial sensing. The Relate sensors contain three ultrasonic transducers (to
cover space in front, left and right of the device) and they operate their own ad
hoc network over combined radio frequency (RF) and ultrasound (US) channels
(note this sensor network is separate from the wireless network that connects
their host devices). Protocol functions implemented over the sensor network in-
clude network discovery and management, collaborative ultrasonic sensing, col-
lection of measurements, and exchange of host information. The Relate sensors
specifically support spatial discovery of their host devices by exchanging the
hosts' network addresses over the sensor network.
The Relate sensors use RF messages to co-ordinate ultrasonic sensing. Sens-
ing is performed by one node emitting ultrasound on its transducers, while all
other nodes listen for a pulse on their transducers. The receiving sensors mea-
sure the peak signal values and the times-of-flight of the ultrasonic pulse with
their three transducers. The smallest time-of-flight is used to calculate a distance
estimate, and an angle-of-arrival estimate is derived from the relative spread of
peak signal values measured across the transducers. The Relate sensors use RF
5Fig. 1. Integration of spatial references to near-by devices in the mobile user interface;
left: extension of Guinard et al.'s Gateways [12]; right: Kortuem et al.'s map view [11].
to share and collect sensor data, and each sensor provides the collected data
to its host device. This then enables the host devices to compute their relative
positions very accurately. Hazas et al. report a 90% precision around 8 cm in
position and 25◦ in orientation [10]: these figures and our practical experience
suggest sufficient accuracy for reliable disambiguation of devices. By collabora-
tively sharing US measurements over RF, partial obstruction can be dealt with
in principle. However, for spatial authentication we rely on direct line of sight
between the authenticating devices.
3.3 User interface design
Spatial discovery and sensing happen automatically and unobtrusively. Users are
then provided with a visualisation of the computed relative positions of devices in
the interface on their own personal device. The visualisation has to be such that
a user can associate a visual screen object with a device in their environment.
Figure 1 shows two possible implementation. The one on the left is based on
Guinard et al.'s Gateways [12]: these are screen objects arranged around the
edge of the user interface, representing devices in the indicated direction relative
to the user's device, and here extended to also show distance information. The
one on the right is adapted from [11] and shows a map view with icons spatially
arranged in correspondence with the actual layout of devices discovered around
the user's device. Key to our concept is that the visualisation reflects the `real'
spatial layout, so that users can make a connection between what they see and
what their device sees (and visualises). This allows users to invoke interactions
by spatial reference, for example simply by dragging an object onto a Gateway or
icon representing a remote device. A device thus selected as targeted is associated
with a particular bearing and distance as measured with on-board sensors.
64 Threat Analysis
The key idea underlying our method is to use spatial references for verification
of device authenticity. In this section we consider threats in the context of the
ultrasonic sensing approach we introduced above, as well as threat scenarios that
arise on application level.
4.1 Attacker capabilities
There are three channels of concern: the communication network between de-
vices, e.g. wireless LAN with a TCP/IP stack, the radio frequency channel used
for communication between spatial sensing devices (RF ), and the ultrasound
channel used for sending and receiving ultrasonic pulses (US ). We assume an
attacker (`Eve') to be capable of gaining complete control over the wireless com-
munication channels. This allows Eve to perform a 'man-in-the-middle' (MITM)
attack on the wireless channels. Assuming to devices A and B, the attacker E can
pretend to A that it is B, and to B that it is A, and thus agree to a cryptographic
key with A and separately with B. A and B will be unaware of this and believe
to communicate securely with each other when in fact they are communicating
via E (who might be partially or completely relaying their messages).
The aim of our method is to prevent that a man-in-the-middle can succeed.
To this end, spatial references are used during the authentication process, and are
therefore subject to potential attack. We can distinguish between three different
attacker capabilities with regards to tampering with spatial references, in order
of increasing complexity:
1. RF-only : Attacks on any of the wireless channels (RF) are the most danger-
ous, because they can be carried out inconspicuously (see e.g. [13]). With
directed antennas, the possible range of an attacker can significantly exceed
the normal range of the RF channel, as has been demonstrated by an attack
on mobile phones via Bluetooth over a distance of over 1.7 km.
2. US in room: Control over the US channel, on the other hand, is assumed to
be limited. First, for attacks on this channel, an attacker needs to be physi-
cally present in the same room (US is effectively blocked by solid materials
such as walls, doors, and windows). Second, although eavesdropping is easily
possible, injecting US pulses is more difficult. We assume an attacker to be
capable of injecting US pulses at any time with arbitrary strength. Injection
in this sense means to insert completely new messages into the US chan-
nel, while modifying, replacing, or removing other messages is not possible
without detection.
3. US in line: An attacker in the same room can inject US pulses, but receiving
devices will be able to detect the different angle of arrival. The reason is that
 in contrast to distance measurements  angle of arrival is inferred from
relative measurements, i.e. differences in time of arrival or signal strength.
We assume it impossible to fake the angle of arrival of a US pulse, bar the
capability of sound forming for US (which has not yet been shown to be
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thus not be required to fake the angle.
4.2 Sensing-level threats
Attacking the RF channels creates three threats specific to our spatial sensing
system:
(a) by removing all RF messages sent from or to a single device, an attacker
Eve can prevent the device from entering the sensor network, and thus make a
specific device disappear for all other devices  however, this can be detected by
the device in question.
(b) by changing RF messages, Eve can tamper with shared measurements, i.e.
those that are taken by remote sensors and exchanged between Relate sensors.
Additionally, US ranging depends on trigger packets sent via RF.
(c) by controlling these trigger packets, Eve can manipulate distance measure-
ments.
If Eve is spatially aligned line with A and B, she could also send US messages
delayed or ahead of schedule to the effect that her position, from Alice's point of
view, appears to be where Bob is. This creates a fourth specific threat, namely
(d) to fake the perceived distance.
Note that, in contrast to ranging measurements, angle of arrival measure-
ments are trustworthy in our sensing system, as they are derived from signal
peak values measured on with sensors oriented in different directions, and not
from time-of-flight as proposed in [6].
4.3 Application-level threats
The possibility to tamper with spatial references leads to three specific attack
scenarios on the application level.
1. Replacement : The first possibility for attack is to virtually replace another
device. This requires two steps: First, the original communication partner,
in this case B, needs to be `silenced' so that it will no longer be visible in
terms of wireless communication and measurements. Second, Eve needs to
fake her position to appear at the same place where the user (`Alice') expects
B to be. In this attack, interaction happens only between Alice and Eve, and
no interaction happens with B. Scenarios for this threat are thus limited to
asymmetric settings where B is an infrastructure device not monitored by
users.
2. Asynchronous MITM : When the scenario includes application-level feedback
from B to Alice, there is the possibility for an asynchronous MITM attack.
An example for such expected feedback is printing: Alice, when sending a
document to B, expects her document to print shortly afterwards. In this
case, Eve first replaces B as in the first threat, but only temporarily. After fin-
ishing authentication with Alice, she authenticates with B and forwards the
intercepted messages that were originally intended for it. Eve could therefore
8try to avoid detection by forwarding to B and thus completing the high-level
interaction. This scenario requires that B does not verify the origin of the
messages, i.e. that only Alice authenticates B, but not the other way around.
3. Synchronous MITM : For live interaction, like a chat or voice communica-
tion between two users (Alice and Bob) over the secure channel, even the
slight delay of an asynchronous MITM attack would be noticeable. The most
dangerous threat, because it is hard to detect when the attack is being per-
formed, is that of a synchronous MITM. For a synchronous MITM, Eve first
attacks the wireless channel as in the previous threat scenarios. But then
she remains passive during spatial discovery and mutual positioning of Alice
and Bob. Only during spatial authentication she tampers with the spatial
measurements. Thus, she remains virtually undetectable for both Alice and
Bob, while still having full access to their communication. This requires Eve
to be physically between Alice and Bob, because both verify angle of arrival
of spatial relationships.
5 Key Agreement and Peer Authentication
We secure spontaneous interaction between two devices A and B in two phases,
key agreement and peer authentication, as shown in Fig. 2. In the first phase, we
let A and B establish a shared key using a standard, unauthenticated key agree-
ment protocol, such as Diffie-Hellman (DH) [14]. If this is successful, then A and
B can use the agreed key to protect their communication against eavesdropping
and tampering, with E being unable to gain sufficient knowledge of that shared
key. To protect A and B against MITM attacks, we use a second phase for peer
authentication (A establishing that it is really talking to B, and vice versa), and
for verification that A and B are in possession of the same key (which would rule
out the presence of a MITM due to the unique-key property of a protocol such
as DH).
5.1 Peer authentication
The peer authentication process is designed to be symmetric, which means that
the two devices A and B authenticate each other. Even though the interaction
is initiated by A in response to Alice's selection of B as target, it will often be
appropriate that B can also verify the sending device and its relative position,
for example to provide its user Bob with a verified visual indication in his user
interface of where a received document has been sent from (and thus prevent
replacement or asynchronous MITM attacks). As a starting point for authenti-
cation, A has a spatial reference to B as derived from the user's selection of B as
her target, and B can base authentication on a corresponding spatial reference
to A.
Devices A and B use the RF and US channels of their sensor nodes for peer
authentication in order to tightly couple this process with spatial sensing. The
devices engage in a protocol designed to establish that (i) they have agreed
9Fig. 2. Devices A and B secure their interaction by key agreement over a wireless
network channel, followed by peer authentication over the RF and US channels of their
spatial sensors.
to the same key, and (ii) they are A and B as mutually verifiable by spatial
reference. The devices approach this by generating a nonce (a random number
used only once) and by transmitting the nonce encrypted over the RF channel.
They also transmit the plaintext nonce over the US channel in a series of smaller
parts that are coded within the actual distance measurements. When the devices
receive these transmissions, they decrypt the RF message, verify that the content
matches the nonce received via US, and thus establish whether their keys match.
For this approach to be secure, the encoding and the transmission of these nonces
need to be coordinated. In the following, we discuss these two issues and how
they interact with each other.
5.2 A spatial coding technique for trustworthy ultrasonic ranging
When a device receives an ultrasonic pulse, it computes a distance measurement
based on the time-of-flight. As explained above in section 4.2, these distances
can be tampered with. We therefore introduce a method to embed information
in ultrasound pulses, which (i) allows to use US as an out-of-band channel for
message exchange, and (ii) makes the distances trustworthy.
During authentication, the sender delays the sending of pulses to the effect
of adding a certain perceived distance to the measurement, where the added
distance represents information (in our protocol, a substring of the nonce). When
for instance A receives a pulse and computes a distance, this distance is the actual
distance from the sender plus a distance representing the message. A proceeds
with subtracting the reference distance it has of B (note the reference distance is
captured when the user selects a device for interaction). This will let A retrieve
the information (represented as added distance) correctly only if the received
pulse has been sent from a range that corresponds with the relative position of
B. That is, a correct reconstruction of the message implies that the distance is
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(a) The sender delays an US pulse after
the RF trigger to code a message, which
corresponds to a distance in the spatial
domain.
(b) The receiver measures time from trig-
ger to pulse arrival, and subtracts a stored
reference from the corresponding distance
to retrieve the message.
Fig. 3. Message transmission embedded with ultrasonic ranging: The receiver will only
be able to retrieve the message if the sender's distance matches the stored reference.
equal to the reference measurement, and therefore constitutes and implicit check
of spatial integrity. Figure 3 illustrates this mechanism for message transmission
over ultrasound with implicit verification of sending range. In addition to this
implicit distance check, A can verify that the pulse was received from a direction
corresponding with the reference held for B, thus effectively eliminating the
possibility that the US transmission originates from another device but B.
5.3 Preventing MITM relaying
A and B can thus verify that ultrasound pulses are received from the intended
partner device but it is still possible that E is present as MITM on the RF
channel. E would be able to infer the nonces exchanged between A and B by
taking its own US measurements (note that this only requires eavesdropping
on US pulses, which is simple to do as long as E is in the same room), and it
could then use its keys (maliciously agreed with A and B in the key agreement
phase) to re-encrypt the nonces in order to pass the key verification checks of
A and B. To rule this possibility out we use an interlock protocol, which in
essence commits the sender of a message to the message content before it has
been transferred completely [15]. For this purpose, A and B split the encrypted
nonces into multiple parts and take turns in transmitting their parts. The nonces
are encrypted with a block cipher, which means that all message parts need to
be reassembled before the message can be decrypted to retrieve the nonce. If
E now receives a message part from A intended for B, it can not retrieve any
part of the nonce. E will also not receive more message parts from A unless it
passes the current one on to B, as A and B strictly adhere to turn-taking. E's
only choices are then to guess the content for all message parts that will `pass
through' (before they are even transmitted by A and B, let alone decrypted by
them) in order to re-encrypt these successfully (this is practically impossible),
or to relay message parts unchanged in which case A and B will discover that
their keys do not match (thereby detecting the presence of a MITM and aborting
authentication). The interlock protocol thus rules out that a MITM attack on
the RF channel can succeed during peer authentication.
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5.4 Protocol specification
An overview of the protocol phases is shown in Fig. 2. Key agreement takes
place over a wireless network channel, and subsequent key verification and peer
authentication over the RF/US channels of their spatial sensors. The second
phase involves turn-taking of the parties in an interlock protocol over a number
of rounds r. This number will be agreed between devices, in consideration of the
security level, protocol duration, and US channel capacity. The US channel ca-
pacity bu is the number of bits that can be reliably transmitted as distance offset
in each round, and will depend on the characteristics of the sensors used and
sensing protocol details. Assuming a nonce of 128 bits, we would need d128/bue
rounds for transmission of the nonce over US. However, a smaller number of
rounds may be agreed to complete the protocol faster, compromising on how
many bits of the nonce are eventually compared for key verification. With r
agreed, we then set the number of bits that will transmitted over the RF chan-
nel in each round to bm := d128/re, splitting the encrypted nonce into equal
message parts.
We will now describe our protocol more formally using the following notation:
c := E(K,m) describes the encryption of plaintext m under key K with a sym-
metric block cipher,m := D(K, c) the corresponding decryption,H(m) describes
the hashing of the message m with a secure hash algorithm, and m||n describes
the concatenation of strings m and n. Additionally, the notationM [a : b] is used
to describe the substring of a message M starting at bit a and ending at bit b.
Messages that are transmitted to the other party are printed in bold.
1. Key agreement, using the Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol:
(a) A chooses a random number a ∈ {1, ..., q − 1} and transmits X := ga,
B chooses a random number b ∈ {1, ..., q − 1} and transmits Y := gb
(b) A computes KSessa := H(Y
a) and KAutha := H(Y
a||PAD) with some
secure hash algorithm,
B generates KSessb and K
Auth
b correspondingly from X
b
The numbers g, q and the string PAD are assumed to be publicly known.
Although we envisage the use of ephemeral keys, i.e. new values for a and b
for each protocol run, it might be advantageous to use long-term values for
performance reasons. We use KAuth (= KAutha = K
Auth
b ) for key verification
in the peer authentication phase, and KSess (= KSessa = K
Sess
b ) for subse-
quent channel security if the verification succeeds. The additional hashing
to compute two different shared keys provides forward secrecy in the case of
leaked authentication key material (cf. [16, section 15.8.4]), for example by a
known plaintext attack on E(KAuthx , Nx) after the respective Nx is revealed
in the following steps.
2. Peer authentication:
(a) A chooses a nonceNa ∈ {1, ..., 2128 − 1} and computesMa := E(KAutha , Na),
B chooses Nb and computes Mb correspondingly with K
Auth
b
(b) For each round i := 0 . . . r − 1:
 A transmits a RF packet Mia := Ma[i · bm : (i+ 1) · bm − 1] and an
US pulse USPia delayed by Na[i · bu : (i+ 1) · bu − 1] units,
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 B receives message partMia and US pulse USP
i
a, derives a distance
measurement dib,a, and uses the stored reference measurement db,a to
reconstruct the distance-coded message ∆ia := d
i
b,a−db,a. B also veri-
fies the angle of arrival αib,a and compares it with the stored reference
measurement αb,a. If the difference exceeds the typical measurement
error, B aborts the authentication protocol with an error message.
 B transmits Mib := Mb[i · bm : (i + 1) · bm − 1] and USPib delayed
by Nb[i · bu : (i + 1) · bu − 1] units, and acknowledges receipt of A's
RF and US messages for round i,
 A receives Mib and USP
i
b, verifies angle of arrival, computes d
i
a,b,





and acknowledges B's messages for round i
(c) A reassembles all received RF packets M ′b :=M
0
b|| . . . ||Mr−1b , decrypts




b), reassembles the nonce from the dis-
tance offsets N ′′b := ∆
0
b || . . . ||∆r−1b , verifies that N ′′b = N ′b[0 : r · bu − 1],
and sets K := KSessa on match or K := null otherwise,
B reassembles M ′a := M
0
a || . . . ||Mr−1a , decrypts N ′a := D(KAuthb ,M ′a),
reassembles N ′′a := ∆
0
a|| . . . ||∆r−1a , verifies that N ′′a = N ′a[0 : r · bu − 1],
and sets K := KSessb on match or K := null otherwise
Note, if bu < bm (i.e. if fewer bits are transmitted via US than via RF) then
step 2c) only compares r · bu bits of the nonce.
If key agreement and peer authentication are completed successfully, then A
and B can use the session key K to establish a secure channel. The key can be
used as a shared secret for one of the standard protocols such as IPSec with PSK
authentication, or one of the recently specified TLS-PSK cipher suites [17]. Other
options are WPA2-PSK or EAP-FAST. K can be used directly as key material,
rendering additional asymmetric cryptographical operations in the secure chan-
nel implementation unnecessary and thus speeding up channel establishment.
5.5 Implementation
We have implemented the key agreement phase of our protocol over TCP/IP.
As a secure hash we use SHADBL-256, which is a double execution of the stan-
dard SHA-256 message digest to safeguard against length extension and partial-
message collision attacks [16]: SHADBL-256 = SHA-256 ((SHA-256 (m)) |m).
The peer authentication phase of the protocol has been implemented over the
RF/US channel of the Relate sensors, using AES (Rijndael) with a key size of
256 bits as secure block cipher for the interlock protocol. The protocol is tightly
integrated with the Relate spatial sensing protocol. RF packets transmitted for
authentication serve simultaneously as trigger packets for ultrasonic time-of-
flight measurement. Pulses emitted on the US channel serve simultaneously for
ranging and for transmission of nonce message parts.
Derived from the characteristics of the Relate sensors, we have set the number
of bits transmitted in each round over US to bu := 3. In each round, the 3 bit
number is coded as multiples of 25.6 cm which the sender adds as offset to the
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receiver-perceived distance by delaying the US pulse. At the receiver end, this
allows for +/-12.8 cm of measurement inaccuracy to retrieve the 3 bits correctly
(note the reported precision of Relate sensors for this level of accuracy is over
95%). The duration of a round is about 200ms (longer if other devices present are
allowed to `interrupt' the authenticating peers for spatial sensing and exchange
of measurements). Transmission of the complete nonce would require 43 rounds
but the number of rounds has been kept variable in our implementation to allow
users to define their required level of security.
6 Security Analysis
6.1 Message channels
In our case, information is transmitted both via RF and via US. To safeguard
against eavesdropping all RF packets are encrypted with an authentication key,
but over US the nonce will become gradually revealed as the protocol proceeds.
The interlock protocol ensures that this will be of no use to an attacker, as the
protocol forces commitment of encrypted nonce message parts over RF before
the entire nonce can be intercepted on the US channel. The nonce is also strictly
used only once which rules out replay attacks. Complete or selective denial-of-
service attacks can not be protected against under our assumption of completely
insecure RF channels.
As described above, the main motivation for using the interlock protocol is
to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks during authentication. An RF-only
MITM attack would be noticed, and we therefore need to analyse the possibilities
for a concurrent attack on the US channel.
6.2 Ultrasonic sensing and message transmission
Our approach to coding random nonces (section 5.2) and transmitting them via
interlock (section 5.3) prevents all the threats outlined in section 4.2: Threat (a)
constitutes a selective denial-of-service attack that can be detected by time-outs
(when the selected device does not respond at all) or authentication failures
(when the attacking devices responds from a different spatial position). Threat
(b) does not apply to our protocol, because shared measurements are not used
during authentication. Threats (c) and (d) are prevented by the random delays.
As E can not know in advance when a US pulse will be sent by A or B (the
delays are derived from the random nonce part that is kept secret until sending
the pulse), it can not construct the encrypted RF packets to match these delays.
If E injected own US pulses, A and B would also receive the original ones and
thus detect that an attack is happening. E's only chance would be to cancel US
pulses in-transit by generating appropriate anti-US pulses, but this is considered
prohibitively difficult. Furthermore, E would need to be positioned precisely in
the line-of-sight between authenticating devices in order to attempt interception
and manipulation of US pulses but this presence literally in the middle between
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devices would be obvious to the user. Note that this MITM device can not be
arbitrarily small due to a physical limits on the minimum size of ultrasound
transducers.
One remaining risk is that E is positioned in line with A and B, but farther
away instead of in between. If E performs a selective denial-of-service attack
on B and forges distance measurements before authentication is started, it will
be able to fake its perceived and subsequently visualised position as seen by
A. Although for security purposes one does usually not trust other devices's
measurements (they might be collaborating for an attack), we note that these
measurements, shared by benign devices over the Relate RF network, may serve
to reveal ongoing attacks such as this one. The shared measurements are not
used for increasing trust in an authentication protocol run or providing proof
of authentication, but they may still be used for decreasing trust in a protocol
run, when shared measurements do not match local ones. Attacking networks of
multiple Relate devices should therefore be considered significantly harder than
attacking just two devices.
We should also note that attacks on the sensing level become harder in sce-
narios involving mobility of devices. Positioning an attacker unsuspiciously and
directly in line between A and B is not trivial even in static settings. When
at least one of the interacting devices is mobile, an attacker would need to be
constantly re-positioned (or virtualized by sound forming, which is considered
infeasible with the current state of the art in ultrasonic systems).
6.3 Applications
The application-level threats described in section 4.3 are specific to our method.
With the protections of the sensing level described above, the remaining threat
is the misrepresentation of E at the position of B as seen by A. Replacement of
infrastructure devices is hard to detect, and therefore difficult to protect against.
One possibility is to create an explicit application-level feedback from B that can
be verified by Alice, for example to lighting an LED for a few seconds whenever
authentication has succeeded. If Eve replaces B, then B will not light its LED and
Alice can subsequently abort the interaction. The same protection can be used
against asynchronous MITM, which effectively transforms these two scenarios
into a synchronous MITM setting. However, this adds an additional step in the
interaction process that may not be desirable for many applications. A more
pragmatic protection against these remaining replacement and asynchronous
MITM threats is to protect against E being in line with A and B by physical
means, e.g. simply placing B directly in front of a wall and thus making it
impossible for E to be hiding `behind' it.
Synchronous MITM seems prohibitively difficult to perform under the above




The overall security of our method depends on the correct selection of the target
device, and the correct association of the target with a spatial reference. We
need to consider two possible sources of error or incorrect association. One is
that the network communication in the initial steps of our method is not secure.
A user can trust the relative position information it has of other devices as this is
measured with on-board sensors but any additional information exchanged may
be interfered with by an attacker. For example, the Gateway interface shown in
Fig. 1 is based on locally measured spatial information but in addition visualises
type of discovered device based on information received over the wireless net-
work. An attacker might tamper with this to the effect that a different device
type is indicated, which might mislead the user.
The second risk at the level of user interaction is that the user selects the
`wrong' device in their user interface, in the worst case an attacker positioned
near the actual target. i.e. E instead of B, in their user interface. The visual design
of the UI and the accuracy of the spatial layout in correspondence with the `real
world' arrangement of devices will be key factors in reducing the risk of faulty
selection, which of course will also be dependent on number and arrangement of
devices discovered and visualised.
7 Performance Evaluation
The authentication protocol involves evaluation of sensor data with inherent
limitations in accuracy and precision. It is therefore critical to assess impact of
sensor limitations on practical performance.
7.1 Robustness against `false negatives'
Sensors are inherently imprecise. Our authentication protocol is designed to ac-
count for the resulting variance in sensor readings, but only within limits that are
consistent with secure authentication of devices by spatial reference (i.e. there
must be no possibility that devices become confused due to allowances made for
sensor error). As a consequence, the protocol can fail to authenticate legitimate
peers when sensor errors occur that exceed built-in tolerance.
Figure 4 shows the success rate of authenticating legitimate peers dependent
on the number of rounds of the interlock protocol and the distance between the
devices. For this experiment, two devices were positioned facing each other in
direct line of sight at distances of 50cm and 100cm. For each number of rounds,
250 protocol runs were performed. As shown in Fig. 4, success rates are at least
85% and typically above 95%.
Authentication only succeeds if every single US measurement taken during
the protocol rounds is sufficiently accurate. In our experiment, the success rate
did not decrease significantly with the number of rounds. However under less
controlled conditions (e.g. slight movement of devices during the protocol run)
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Fig. 4. Authentication success rate depending on the security level and distance (left);
Authentication speed depending on the security level and distance (right).
a more notable decrease might be expected, as the probability of an erroneous
measurement increases with the number of rounds. Note that the impact of
distance on success rate is not very pronounced and appears to be within error
of measurement (success rates for the larger distance are on average lower, but
not consistently).
7.2 Speed versus security
There is an inherent trade-off in our protocol between speed and security. The
resistance against attacks increases with the number of rounds used for the
interlock protocol, because each round transmits 3 bits of entropy for verifying
the nonce. Therefore, an attacker's chance of guessing a nonce equals 1/23r. To
put this into perspective, after only 5 rounds a nonce would already be harder
to guess than a randomly generated 4-digit PIN number. Also note that our
protocol is symmetric, which means that an attacker would need to guess two
nonces correctly in order to deceive the authenticating devices as MITM.
Figure 4 (right) shows this trade-off with measurements taken for 2, 10,
25, and 43 rounds, obtained with the same experimental setup of devices as
described above. The variations in the time necessary for authentication over
a certain number of rounds stem from the specifics of the underlying RF/US
sensing protocol which can require message retransmits. The dependency on
the distance between the devices is again marginal. As can be seen, a complete
authentication takes around 12 s for 25 rounds.
It is important to understand that a compromise on the number of rounds
in our protocol only impacts on an attacker's one-off chance to guess the correct
nonce to stage an undetected MITM attack. It does not impact on the secu-
rity level of 128 bits that will be provided after successful authentication. This
difference is even more pronounced than in the usual online vs. oine attack
discussion, because of the tight coupling with interaction at the user level. An
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attacker can not repeatedly attack the authentication protocol with an online
attack, because it is only triggered by an explicit user action. Therefore, there is
only a one-off chance for an attack, and any computational attacks are therefore
matched with a security level of 128 bits. Nonetheless, our protocol allows the
user or application to choose the best compromise between speed and security
and scales up to a 128 bit level even for the single attack possibility.
8 Conclusion
We have contributed and discussed a method for establishing secure spontaneous
interaction on the basis of spatial references. Spatial references are a type of
context that allows users to match what they see with what their device sees.
At the core of our method is a peer authentication protocol that uses relative
bearing and distance between devices. We have presented an implementation
using ultrasound for spatial measurements; however, the method can also be
realised with other sensors. For example, one could consider use of cameras
(which are becoming ubiquitous in mobile phones and handhelds) and vision
techniques to obtain spatial references between devices.
The concrete implementation we have presented uses ultrasound, for peer-
to-peer spatial sensing, and for out-of-band message transfer as part of a key
verification protocol. We have provided a comprehensive threat analysis for ul-
trasonic ranging and contributed a novel coding technique that allows a sender
to guarantee that a message was sent from a particular range. This technique
can thus be used to to construct a spatially-authentic channel from sender to
receiver.
Our protocol implementation is embedded in a spatial sensing scheme that
more generally provides devices with accurate relative positions of peers discov-
ered within interaction range. The method further involves a user interaction
model based on visualisation of relative device positions, integrated in the user
interface for direct manipulation. The method as presented relies on spatial sen-
sors, however, the sensors are not specific to the purpose of providing security
but have broader use for support of spatial interaction and services. Cameras
and various other sensors are already ubiquitous in mobile devices, and given the
general utility of ultrasonic transducers for ranging tasks it is easily perceivable
that these will become commonplace as well.
As a final note it has to be stressed that the presented approach fundamen-
tally differs from proximity-based methods such as near-field communication
(NFC). Any proximity-based method that relies on a quantitative property of
the out-of-band channel such as radio signal strength is open to attack from
further afield  for example to attack NFC by increasing communication range
with more powerful senders and/or more sensitive receivers. In contrast, our
method exploits the qualitative out-of-band properties of ultrasound: that it is
blocked by solid materials and that angle of arrival can not be faked.
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